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Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: 
Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition 
Luke March 
Contemporary Russia is not a democracy. This is hardly a contentious 
statement outside Russia itself, where the consensus view (as shown most 
starkly by Freedom House's reclassification of Russia as "not free" since 
2005) is that under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia moved from 
a "hybrid regime" (an amalgam of democratic and authoritarian elements 
occupying the "gray" zone between liberal democracy and outright dic 
tatorship) to something approaching full-scale autocracy.1 Nevertheless, 
the nature, salience, and future of the democratic potential within Russia 
is still very much debated, even as the Russian authorities (most recently 
with their promulgation of the concept "sovereign democracy") rebut 
criticism ever more insistently.2 
In parallel, an increasing emphasis has been placed on viewing the 
United Russia party (Edinaia Rossiia) as illustrating the paradoxes of Rus 
sian party politics. On the one hand, the Kremlin claims to be creating a 
modern party system. On the other, United Russia is a "party of power" 
that has produced the kind of "dominant power politics" that recalls 
"hegemonic party systems" such as those in Mexico, Taiwan, and South 
Korea.3 There has, however, been far less focus on the increasingly di 
minished political opposition.4 This is a mistake: as Robert Dahl notes, 
1. Some early examples of this view are: Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid 
Regimes, "Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21-35; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. 
Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 13, 
no. 2 (April 
2002): 51-65; and Graeme Gill, "A New Turn to Authoritarian Rule in Russia?" Democrati 
zation 13, no. 1 (February 2006): 58-77. 
2. For some notable exceptions to the view that Russia is not 
a democracy, see "Rus 
sia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Russian Presidential Election?Affirming Democracy 
or 
Confirming Autocracy?" at www.russiaprofile.org for 7 March 2008 (last accessed 15 May 
2009). Richard Sakwa, "'New Cold War' or Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International 
Politics," International Affairs 84, no. 2 (March 2008): 241-67 insists that Russia's demo 
cratic potential is still rosier than its bleak international image suggests. 
3. An excellent account of recent reforms to the party system can be found in 
Kenneth Wilson, "Party-System Development under Putin," Post-Soviet Affairs 22, 
no. 4 
(October-December 2006): 314-48. Studies of United Russia and its antecedents before 
this volume include Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, "The Party of Power in Russian 
Politics," Acta Political International Journal of Political Science 35, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 
123-45; Regina Smyth, "Building State Capacity from the Inside Out: Parties of Power 
and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia," Politics and Society 30, 
no. 4 
(December 2002): 555-78; Zoe Knox, Pete Lentini, and Brad Williams, "Parties of Power 
and Russian Politics: A Victory of the State over Civil Society?" Problems of Post-Communism 
53, no. 1 (January-February 2006): 3-14; and Andrew Konitzer and Stephen 
K Wegren, 
"Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation: United Russia as the 
Party of Power," Publius 36, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 503-22. 
4. A notable exception is Vladimir Gel'man, "Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying 
Species?" Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 3 (July-September 2005): 226-46. 
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the symbiosis of opposition and regime means that studying the former 
inevitably illuminates the latter.5 
My focus here is on the party Just Russia: Motherland/Pensioners/ 
Life (Spravedlivaia Rossiia, hereafter Just Russia) as a case study of the 
problems and issues confronting opposition in Russia. A self-proclaimed 
"new socialist" party, Just Russia was established on 28 October 2006 
through the merger of three smaller left-leaning groups, Motherland 
(Rodina), the Russian Party of Life (Rossiiskaia partiia zhizni), and the 
Russian Pensioners' Party (Rossiiskaia partiia pensionerov) .6 In the Rus 
sian Duma elections of 2007, Just Russia gained 7.7 percent of the vote and 
38 seats?last place but still one of only four parties currently represented 
in Russia's parliament. 
Just Russia's nature is poorly understood: skeptics viewed it initially 
as a Kremlin pocket opposition ("the opposition of the master's maid to 
the master's butler"), entirely fake and designed essentially to fool the 
electorate.7 More optimistic analysts believed that Just Russia was a more 
serious alternative "party of power," possessing the potential either for 
greater (albeit limited) multipartism and opposition or serious elite level 
conflict.8 
In the event, during the December 2007 election campaign, neither 
view was confirmed; contrary to optimists, Just Russia never challenged 
United Russia's hegemony as a "party of power" and serious elite conflict 
did not openly erupt. Contrary to pessimists, Just Russia limped into par 
liament, despite widely reported Kremlin indifference. 
My aim here is threefold. First, to understand why Just Russia emerged. 
Why, unlike previous disastrous attempts at forming a moderate left oppo 
sition, did it attain (however modest) success in 2007? Second, to examine 
what Just Russia illustrates about the role of opposition within the Rus 
sian party system. Does it indicate greater pluralistic potential or merely 
a greater imitation of it? What does Just Russia reveal about the way the 
Kremlin "manages" opposition and its success in doing so? Third, to re 
flect on the role of opposition parties in "electoral authoritarian" regimes: 
how are they manipulated or even manufactured; how much "opposition" 
can they even profess? 
The answer to these questions will show that both optimists and pessi 
mists are partly right. Certainly, Just Russia can be understood as a regime 
created "parastatal party" aimed at providing limited competition for the 
main "party of power" (United Russia). Contrary to the most skeptical 
5. Robert Alan Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, 
1966). 
6. "Just Russia" is preferred to some other translations (e.g., "AJust Russia," "Russia of 
Justice") by analogy to "United Russia" and to others (e.g., "Fair Russia") because its slogan 
"social justice" is a recognized, if disputed, left-wing term. 
7. Vladimir Pribylovskii, quoted in Nabi Abdullaev, "New Party Says Kremlin Knows 
Best," Moscow Times, 30 October 2006. Two other analysts holding this view are Boris Ka 
garlitskii and Boris Makarenko (partly). 
8. For examples, see Georgy Bovt, "A Test-Tube Party," Russia Profile 4, no. 1 (27 Feb 
ruary 2007): 10; Alexei Makarkin, "Election Speculations," Russia Profiled no. 8 (3 Sep 
tember 2007): 7-8. Vitalii Tretiakov and Igor Bunin expressed similar views. 
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analyses, however, while Just Russia is a heavily manipulated "virtual" op 
position, it is not simply a fake designed to dupe the electorate but rep 
resents long-term Kremlin strategic interests in channeling opposition 
and thus stabilizing the political regime. Moreover, it has an identifiable, 
ideological position (left-wing social democratic) and electorate, which it, 
albeit imperfectly and partially, represents. 
As the optimists argued, Just Russia's evolution indicates the plural 
ism of competing Kremlin interests and the potential for elite conflict. 
Although this conflict was effectively contained in the 2007-8 elections, 
Just Russia is illustrative of the fundamental paradox of a "managed op 
position" for a regime that needs an opposition as a legitimation of its 
authority to govern. If that opposition is too stage-managed, it ceases to 
become an opposition in any meaningful or visible sense; if it is too op 
positionist, it can rapidly evolve from a management problem into an 
unmanageable problem. 
"Parastatal" Oppositions in "Electoral Authoritarian" Regimes 
Although parties are a necessary feature of democracy, they are far from 
a sufficient element. Analysts have noted that the rise of democracy as 
"the only game in town" has been accompanied by the rise of "pseudode 
mocracy," whereby multiparty systems and organized oppositions exist 
in regimes that are substantively undemocratic.9 "Pseudodemocracies" 
range from "feckless pluralist" semi-democracies, with (imperfectly) com 
petitive party systems and civil liberties, to "electoral" or "competitive" au 
thoritarian regimes.10 The latter demonstrate "hegemonic party systems" 
embodying "dominant power politics" whereby "an institutionalized rul 
ing party makes extensive use of coercion, patronage, media control, 
and other tools to reduce opposition parties to decidedly 'second-class' 
status," and the "licensed opposition" cannot challenge for power.11 The 
precise degree of a regime's democracy is difficult to ascertain, because 
nondemocratic regimes have become expert at pretending to be demo 
cratic, and almost none would admit that they rule in defiance of the 
demos. Nevertheless, because of increased Kremlin control over political 
life, there is every basis for saying that Russia is precisely such an "electoral 
authoritarian" system, where "by placing elections under tight authoritar 
9. Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?"Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996): 
20-37, and Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," 21-35. 
10. On "feckless pluralism" and "dominant power politics," 
see Thomas Carothers, 
"The End of the Transition Paradigm, "Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 5 
21. On "electoral authoritarianism," see Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," 
Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 36-50, and Andreas Schedler, "From Electoral 
Authoritarianism to Democratic Consolidation," in Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, and 
Riordan Roett, eds., Mexico's Democracy at Work: Political and Electoral Dynamics (Boulder, 
Colo., 2004), 9-38. On "competitive authoritarianism," see Levitsky and Way, "The Rise 
of Competitive Authoritarianism." 
11. Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" 25. For the concept of "hegemonic party sys 
tems," see Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge, 
Eng., 1976), 230-38. 
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ian controls [elites try] to cement their continued hold on power. Their 
dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks 
of democratic uncertainty."12 
Many analysts note that under electoral authoritarianism, opposition 
parties are "permitted to exist largely to shore up the perception of the 
dominant party's right to govern," that is, their principal role is to pro 
vide external and internal legitimacy.13 For all but the most dictatorial 
regimes, opposition is more than a mere facade, however, and indeed 
fulfills several important functions: responding to the public, providing 
elite recruitment and training, and stabilizing the regime. 
For example, hegemonic party systems encounter the contradiction 
that the "part" cannot democratically or effectively encompass the whole. 
A party cannot incorporate all national interest groups and policy plat 
forms without losing its internal ideological and organizational cohesive 
ness: accordingly, there arises the need for "a mechanism by which regime 
perpetuation can be reconciled with some degree of political pluralism."14 
Regimes such as Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
before 1988 and Putin's Russia therefore developed an interest in "man 
aging" but not destroying political competition, guaranteeing opposition 
groups "a limited voice in public affairs, including a degree of indepen 
dent political space in the public square, in return for abiding by the 
rules set down by the government."15 "Competitive" multiparty elections 
that the regime invariably wins reinforce its own legitimacy, and simul 
taneously allow mobilization of and responsiveness to public demands, 
thereby preempting potential problems.16 
Similarly, limited competition acts as an antidote to the centralized 
and bureaucratic tendencies of a single ruling party. It offers lower-level 
party cadres alternative career paths and thus limits the risk of defec 
tions from the regime, while co-opting opposition elites into regime 
sanctioned activity and marginalizing extra-systemic opposition. Overall, 
it bolsters regime stability by reducing (particularly electoral) unpredict 
ability, hard-wiring competitiveness and responsiveness, and combining 
openness with control. Unsurprisingly, hegemonic party systems are the 
most durable form of authoritarianism. 
"Managed opposition" is as paradoxical as a "one-party democracy," 
however, and electoral authoritarian regimes have evolved a panoply of 
methods to prevent the paradox from becoming too blatant, many of 
12. Schedler, "Menu of Manipulation," 36-37.1 prefer the term electoral authoritarian 
to terms such as managed pluralism because it highlights that elite authority and control 
rather than pluralism are the driving rationales of the political regime and also embeds 
Russia within a rich comparative literature. This is, however, not at all to assert that an 
authoritarian Russia is a "USSR-lite" or has no democratic potential. 
13. Dorothy J. Solinger, "Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico," 
Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 31. 
14. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Mexico and Russia: Mirror Images?" Demokratizatsiya: The 
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 10, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 493. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, eds., The Awkward Embrace: One-Party 
Domination and Democracy (Amsterdam, 1999). 
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which have been employed simultaneously.17 At one extreme are coercive 
methods, such as harassment, intimidation, or assassination of opposition 
candidates. More subtle and hence more widely favored are administrative 
methods including rigging ballots; bribing, compromising, or otherwise 
co-opting opposition candidates; and inducing party splits. Much used 
(because they are formally legal and predictable) are strict registration 
requirements that allow undesirable parties to be banned or otherwise 
pressured or electoral systems that strongly favor the governing party.18 
Overall, hegemonic parties practice what might be called a "syncretic he 
gemony," whereby through cultural norms and co-optative practices they 
successfully represent themselves as national leaders and delegitimize the 
opposition as disloyal.19 
The understudied facets of party hegemony of particular relevance to 
Just Russia are direct attempts to form "parastatal" parties (that is, those 
partially or completely controlled by the state) that mimic opposition and 
attempt to channel it in regime-supporting directions, particularly used 
by regimes during times of political change. For example, in authoritar 
ian South Korea the Chun Doo-hwan regime from 1980 to 1987 banned 
opposition parties and created loyal opposition parties in order to co-opt 
opposition activists.20 More durable were Mexico's opposition parties un 
der the PRI regime. In addition to the partial co-optation of the principal 
opposition National Action Party (PAN), the Authentic Party of the Mexi 
can Revolution (PARM) and the Party of the Cardenist Front of National 
Reconstruction (PFCRN) were archetypal parastatal parties. They always 
endorsed PRI presidential candidates and mostly served as mechanisms 
for leaders to get congressional seats and enrich themselves on the basis 
of their parties' registrations.21 They acted as "electoral scabs" whose elec 
toral participation undercut PAN's inclination to boycott.22 
More blatant still was Nigeria's contribution to party building. In 
1996, General Abacha allowed five parties to register, which then "inde 
pendently" all endorsed his (unopposed) presidential candidacy.23 This 
might have seemed absurd if his predecessor General Babangida had not 
founded two pro-regime parties in 1989, one "a little to the left" (the So 
cial Democratic Party, SDP) and one "a little to the right" (the National 
Republican Convention) as part of a "transition" to democracy. With iden 
tical headquarters and near-identical party programs and regime fund 
17. For example, see Schedler, "Menu of Manipulation." 
18. Gvosdev, "Mexico and Russia." 
19. The term syncretic hegemony is my own but cf. Giliomee and Simkins, eds., The 
Awkward Embrace. 
20. These parties included the Democratic Korean Party, the Democratic Society 
Party, and the Korean People's Party. Youngmi Kim, e-mail communication, 
6 March 
2008. 
21. Steve Wuhs, e-mail communication, 21 February 2008. 
22. Jose Antonio Crespo, "Party Competition in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects," 
in 
Kevin J. Middlebrook, ed., Dilemmas of Political Change in Mexico (London, 2003), 57-82. 
23. Festus O. Egwaikhide and Victor Adefemi Isumonah, "Nigeria Paralysed: 
Socio 
political Life under General Sani Abacha," Africa Development 26, nos. 3-4 (2001): 
219-41. 
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ing, the parties were mocked as the "Yes Party" and "Yes, Sir Party," respec 
tively.24 Yet, as a warning to democracy managers everywhere, the parties 
took on a life of their own, becoming vehicles for "moneybags" to unite 
around clientelistic and ethnic rather than programmatic cleavages. The 
army refused to recognize the victory of the SDP candidate Chief Abiola 
in the 1993 elections, arrested him, and suspended the transition. 
Moreover, it is often forgotten that many communist regimes were 
(theoretically) "hegemonic party systems" where the ruling party led a 
"popular front" government of noncommunist parties. In East Germany, 
for example, parties such as the German Liberal Democratic Party and 
National Democratic Party had very circumscribed roles in candidate se 
lection and election campaigns but had guaranteed parliamentary rep 
resentation.25 These "parties" acted as "transmission belts" to integrate 
and monitor influential social groups that the Communist Party could 
not completely subjugate (for example, the Christian and peasant strata). 
Putin's KGB service in Dresden in the 1980s means he was surely aware 
of the "Dresden party system" and the "constructive" role played by para 
statal multipartism.26 
"Virtual" Opposition and Regime in Russia 
What relevance do such examples have to Russia? Until Putin came to 
power, most observers would have answered "little," but this has begun 
to change. Only belatedly have analysts started to move beyond a con 
ceptualization of the Russian party system as a quasi-European one with 
recognizable ideological party families (usually "liberal/reformist," "na 
tionalist," "communist/left" and "centrist/party of power").27 The cen 
tralizing tendencies under Putin have led to increased attention being 
paid to Kremlin management of the party system and far greater analysis 
of the notion of the "party of power" (partiia vlasti).28 
Some state that the "party of power" is an entirely sui generis post 
Soviet phenomenon.29 This is untrue. It has strong similarities to hege 
monic parties like the PRI in terms of both presidential control over the 
party and the dominance exercised through parastatal mechanisms and 
24. Julius O. Ihonvbere, Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy (New Bruns 
wick, N.J., 1994). 
25. Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States (London, 1967). 
26. Vladimir Ryzhkov, cited in Vladimir Gel'man, "The Transformation of Russia's 
Party System," Russian Analytical Digest, no. 19 (17 April 2007): 12-14. 
27. For example, Stephen White, Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommu 
nist Society (Cambridge, Eng., 2000), and Timothy J. Col ton and Michael McFaul, Popular 
Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000 (Washington, D.C., 
2003). 
28. Wilson, "Party-System Development under Putin"; Oversloot and Verheul, "The 
Party of Power in Russian Politics"; Smyth, "Building State Capacity from the Inside Out"; 
Knox, Lentini, and Williams, "Parties of Power and Russian Politics"; and Konitzer and 
Wegren, "Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation." 
29. For example, Knox, Lentini, and Williams, "Parties of Power and Russian 
Politics." 
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clientelistic arrangements. The crucial difference between the party of 
power and other hegemonic parties is that whereas the latter have mass 
membership, coherent structures, and consistent ideologies and are the 
central conduits for policy making and patronage, in the former, the 
source of authority lies entirely outside the party (in presidential struc 
tures) . Moreover, the party of power is never completely "in power" but 
simply a disposable component of broader regime-type relationships? 
that is, a "hegemonic bloc" in the Gramscian sense?used instrumentally 
by those already in power to remain there. Only under Putin has the party 
of power assumed a more PRI-like form in which United Russia professes 
a liberal-conservative program, but the political elite (above all Putin and 
Dmitrii Medvedev) refuse to subordinate themselves completely to party 
membership, indicating United Russia's still-disposable status. 
Of course, the Russian authorities' managerial efforts are not con 
fined to the party of power, and this is increasingly reflected in Russia 
watchers' conceptualizations of the party system as a whole. For example, 
Henry Hale identifies "ideocratic" (single-issue and protest parties), pro 
grammatic parties (with consistent, identifiable ideologies), and "clien 
telistic parties" including the parties of power.30 Richard Sakwa identifies 
a similar constellation, although tilted somewhat more toward pro-regime 
parties: "programmatic parties" (with a clear ideology adopted by intra 
party democracy), "project parties" set up soon before elections as some 
short-term elite machination, and "regime parties," including the party of 
power, "established to manipulate and shape political space."31 Such char 
acterizations are useful as parsimonious general ideal-types but do not get 
us especially far with understanding particular parties such as Just Russia 
(which has program, project, and regime/clientelistic elements). 
Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul focus more explicitly on pro 
regime parties and provide some relevant typologies for our study here: 
the "adjunct/alternative party of power," which is ideologically identical to 
a "party of power" but designed as a sparring partner to keep the elite on 
its toes and test new personnel, and a "favored opposition party" (parties 
such as Rodina in 2003 that are "professional double crossers and fakers" 
who channel opposition to support the elite).32 These typologies provide 
a range of elite options that makes Mexico and Nigeria's parastatal parties 
look amateurish, but they remain static, with little attempt to analyze the 
dynamic interaction between regime parties. The most significant such at 
tempt is undoubtedly Andrew Wilson's concept "virtual politics."33 Wilson 
argues that the Leninist "culture of deceit" with its "organized victories," 
30. Henry E. Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia?Democracy, Federalism and the State (Cam 
bridge, Eng., 2006). 
31. Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, 2d ed. (London, 2007), 101-2. 
32. Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, "Managing Democracy: Political Parties and 
the State in Russia, "Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 22, no. 3 (September 
2006): 383-405. 
33. Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Ha 
ven, 2005). On the concept of virtuality, see also Oksana Gaman-Golutvina, "Politika: Par 
tii i vlast'," Svobodnaia mysl' 21, no. 9 (2004): 85-92. 
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fake plebiscites, and satellite parties infiltrated by double agents has led 
to a falsification of the entire electoral process whereby parties (and poli 
tics in general) are manipulated by the elite to monopolize power and 
the competition for it.34 The aim of the elite is simultaneously to avoid 
real politics and to mimic it, a process in which "designer parties" play a 
great role. 
Wilson's approach can be criticized: it assumes that post-Soviet politi 
cal culture is, sui generis, ignoring instances of manipulation practiced 
elsewhere; it assumes a greater degree of coordination and control than 
the Kremlin has managed (especially in the El'tsin era), and (as shown 
above) the degree to which a limited amount of genuine "healthy com 
petition" is necessary for regime survival. Moreover, it can give too much 
credence to unverifiable rumor.35 Nevertheless, the approach is illuminat 
ing. Wilson does not argue that all politics is faked but that it is multidi 
mensional.36 Indeed, even the mimicry of public politics is itself deeply 
political?"virtuality" indicates that the political stakes are extremely 
high. Leninist practice of kto-kogo ("who beats whom") is echoed in the 
emphasis on ends justifying means and the elite's unscrupulousness in 
deliberately blurring the distinction between real and fake in the service 
of a genuine political contest.37 
Virtual politics is of great utility in understanding the origins and evo 
lution of Just Russia, in particular its multidimensionality and how real 
and virtual are combined. The party is not simply a Potemkin party. On 
one level it is a left-wing social democratic programmatic party appealing 
to paternalist voter sentiment; on another, an "alternative party of power" 
designed to spar with the elite while representing a careerist project for 
elements of that elite; on yet another it is a "project /favored opposition 
party" designed to marginalize more independent opposition (particu 
larly the communists). During its short life to date, the party has vacillated 
between these three facets and this explains why it has arguably failed to 
achieve any of its principal aims. 
The Regime's Left Leg? Why Just Russia Emerged 
That Just Russia is a Kremlin creation is no secret. The project was initi 
ated by deputy presidential chief of staff Vladislav Surkov. With remark 
able candor, Surkov stated to a conference of the Russian Party of Life on 
24 March 2006: "The problem is that there is no alternative to the large 
scale party; in society there is no 'second leg' on which to step when the 
first has gone numb. This makes the system unstable . . . the task of the 
34. Wilson, Virtual Politics, 38. 
35. As just one example, Wilson's allegation that communist leader Gennadii Ziuga 
nov took money from "father of perestroika" Aleksandr Iakovlev is scarcely credible (they 
were political enemies), and its source is anticommunist kompromat. See Wilson, Virtual 
Politics, 224. 
36. Ibid., 46. 
37. For example, Andrew Wilson, "The Putin Succession" (unpublished paper, 
2008). 
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.170 on Mon, 3 Feb 2014 06:03:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
512 Slavic Review 
coming political period is to bring into being a political force that can, at 
some point, replace the now dominant party."38 
The main surprise of this statement was its audience. The Russian 
Party of Life was an archetypal "favored opposition project" that had 
shown anything except life and looked poor timber for such a "second 
leg." It was known, if at all, for vaguely populist and ecological platforms 
(including the protection of the Russian muskrat) and saw itself as "nei 
ther left nor right."39 In 2003, it had gained a meager 1.96 percent of the 
vote in alliance with the quasi-socialist (and similarly platitudinous) Party 
of Russia's Rebirth (Partiia vozrozhdeniia Rossii). For the Kremlin, the 
undoubted advantage of the Russian Party of Life was the complete loyalty 
of its leader, Sergei Mironov, speaker of Russia's upper house, the Federa 
tion Council. Mironov had known Putin since 1994 and proved his worth 
(and lack of presidential potential) in 2004 when he ran an "insurance" 
campaign in support of Putin, coming in last.40 
The Kremlin's intention to form a "left leg" of the party system has 
been proclaimed for a long time and was first signaled in 1995 when then 
speaker of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin headed a left(ish) alternative to 
the main party of power Our Home Is Russia (Nash dom?Rossiia). Ryb 
kin's efforts were a fiasco, gaining a mere 1.1 percent of the December 
1995 vote and succeeding only in giving the term Rybkinizatsiia (betrayal 
followed by oblivion) to the Russian language. The project failed for sev 
eral reasons. First, it was simply too public (the name "Ivan Rybkin bloc" 
laid bare its artificiality). Second, it was premature. In 1995, the elector 
ate was still too polarized and the left brand "too closely associated with 
antisystemic opposition [that is, the communists] for the voters to back 
'loyal' reds."41 Third, it was poorly executed: the El'tsin-era elite was too 
ambivalent about and incompetent at party building to create one party 
of power, let alone two, and key elite figures joined neither. 
After the 1996 presidential elections crowned the Communist Party of 
the Russian Federation (KPRF) as the principal opposition, the Kremlin 
dropped the idea of forming an independent left, focusing instead on 
trying to coerce, co-opt, and corrupt the communists into assuming the 
role of "His Majesty's loyal opposition" in a two-party system. Communist 
38. Surkov's statement at "Vstrecha gruppy deputatov ot Rossiiskoi partii ZHIZNI s 
zamestitelem Rukovoditelia Administratsii Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii?pomoshch 
nikom Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii V. Iu. Surkovym," at the Web site of Russian Party of 
Life, www.RPVITA.ru (accessed 22 May 2007; no longer available). This announcement was 
allegedly not for public consumption, see "Goszakaz na partiiu budushchego," 16 August 
2006, atwww.lenta.ru/articles/2006/08/16/surkov/ (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
39. "Mironov, Sergei,"Lentapediia, 19December2007, atwww.lenta.ru/lib/14159448/ 
full.htm (last accessed 15 May 2009). See also www.mironov.info/Publications/6226.html 
(last accessed 15 May 2009). 
40. For more on the Russian Party of Life, see Wilson, Virtual Politics, 93. 
41. Wilson, Virtual Politics, 94. See also Knox, Lentini, and Williams, "Parties of Power 
and Russian Politics," and Laura Belin, "Ivan Rybkin: An Insider Falls Out," RFE/RL special 
report The Russian Federation Votes 2003-04, at www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/ 
bio/rybkin.asp (accessed 14 March 2008; no longer available). 
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opposition became increasingly compromised and "cosmetic."42 Never 
theless, it was only with the advent of Putin that the attempt to "tame" the 
communists really accelerated. Putin consistently challenged the KRPF to 
reform (into a modern social democratic organization) or die, even sug 
gesting they rename themselves the Russian Social Democratic Workers' 
Party.43 
Furthermore, the experience of elite splits in the 1999 Duma elections 
"scared the Kremlin straight" into realizing the necessity of a united party 
of power. This centralization placed increasing administrative pressure on 
the communists (most notably through the Kremlin-created Rodina bloc 
in the December 2003 elections that helped halve the communist vote) .44 
The KPRF had proved unwilling and unable to become a fully construc 
tive opposition, but they were losing any braking capacity over such an 
attempt. According to Rodina leader Dmitrii Rogozin, Putin told him in 
2003: "Instead of the communists sooner or later a serious and modern 
thinking left party must arrive. And that will be good for the country."45 
Nevertheless, Putin cannot be taken at his word: the Kremlin has seemed 
concerned to keep the communists "in the box," marginalized but ma 
nipulable at key moments (such as in 2004 presidential elections and the 
2005 Moscow city Duma elections, when they were exploited to attack 
Rodina), and has repeatedly shied away from replacing the communists 
altogether with a potentially more unpredictable opposition. 
As Kremlin strategists (reported to be assiduous students of public 
opinion) undoubtedly realized, the KPRF's decline did not result in the 
elimination of opposition sentiments but rather in a "huge unfulfilled 
niche of left-statist orientation."46 In post-2000 conditions of fast increas 
ing but unevenly distributed national wealth, it is unsurprising that various 
opinion polls showed an increase in voters' redistributionist sentiments. 
In polls conducted by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public 
Opinion (Vserossiiskii tsentr izucheniia obshchestvennogo mneniia, 
VTsIOM) in March 2007, 46 percent of respondents said they supported 
"socialism" (although only 10 percent of those considered it feasible in 
Russia) ,47 Mikhail Khodorkovskii's expectation of an electoral "Left Turn" 
may have been an exaggeration, but nevertheless, spontaneous public 
demonstrations against the government's mishandled monetization of 
benefits reform of 2005 and strong regional performances for Rodina 
and the Russian Pensioners' Party thereafter indicated that leftist rhetoric 
had potential. These two anticommunist projects increasingly took on an 
42. Luke March, "The Russian Communist Party in 2000: A Cosmetic Opposition," 
Analysis of Current Events 12, no. 7-8 (December 2000): 15-19. 
43. Anna Nikolaeva and Elena Rudneva, "Urok predannosti," Vedomosti, 29 June 
2007, 2. 
44. Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia ? 229. 
45. Dmitrii Rogozin, Vrag naroda (Moscow, 2006), 380. 
46. PutevoditeV po vyboram: Politicheskaia Rossiia-2007 (Moscow, 2007), 211. 
47. "Press-vypusk no 656: Sotsializm v Rossii: Vozmozhen li on? I nuzhen li?" at wciom 
.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/4243.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
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autonomous momentum and aspired to more than the 1-2 percent niche 
envisaged for them by the Kremlin. 
Electoral arithmetic encouraged a renewal of Kremlin attempts to 
monopolize the left electorate, but shorter-term concerns with the post 
Putin succession made this a priority. As Surkov's comments about United 
Russia's "numbness" indicated, there was deep Kremlin dissatisfaction 
with the main party of power. United Russia was seen as electorally inert, 
polling consistently far short of Putin's personal rating. Moreover its un 
erringly disciplined voting in the Duma made its bureaucratism and the 
"complete paralysis of political life" all too public, at the same time as its 
center-right profile (for example, support for a flat-rate income tax and its 
lax attitude toward business corruption) made it ill-equipped to tap mod 
erate leftist voters (perhaps 30 percent of the population) who supported 
Putin personally but not his government's neo-liberal social policy.48 Un 
surprisingly there had been discussions about splitting United Russia into 
left and right wings in order to inject a modicum of dynamism. 
United Russia's inertia was a particular problem given the Kremlin's 
adoption of a proportional representation system for the 2007 elections. 
As intended, this gave the Kremlin greater control over regional candi 
date nominations, but it also meant that United Russia would need ap 
proximately 66 percent of the vote to attain the same number of seats 
(approximately 300) it had after 2003, when it had dominated single 
mandate district races. Hence an urgent need arose to tap those Putin 
supporters at the "electoral periphery" of United Russia, who were prone 
to drifting toward more opposition-minded projects like Rodina.49 As 
Kremlin-connected commentator Sergei Markov declared, the idea of Just 
Russia "was to have Putin's influence spread all over the political field."50 
In this way, Just Russia was very much an "alternative party of power," forc 
ing United Russia to campaign more vigorously without threatening its 
dominance. 
Simultaneously, Just Russia was intended to act as an official "opposi 
tion" that channeled and neutralized social protest, ever more important 
with the KPRF's decline. As Surkov told the Party of Life in March 2006: 
it is "better that the electorate that is opposed to all forms of administra 
tion is attracted to you than to destructive forces."51 Indeed Just Russia 
quickly helped streamline the party system as the Kremlin had long advo 
cated, "vacuuming up" defunct projects. Just Russia promised to become 
the "center of the [left] solar system," absorbing parties such as Gennadii 
48. Quote from Georgy Bovt, "Competition from Above," Russia Profile 4, 
no. 2 
(19 March 2007): 13. For other discussion, see Aleksandr Buzgalin, "Pokhorony KPRF 
okazalis' prezhdevremennym," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 March 2007, 3, and Aleksei Kiva, 
"Po 
modeli 'suverennoi demokratii,'" Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 10 (14-20 March 2007), at www 
.lgz.ru/archives/htmLarch/lgl02007/Polosy/2_l.htm (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
49. Aleksei Makarkin, vice president of the Center of Political Technologies, inter 
view, Moscow, 16 April 2008. 
50. Markov quoted in Dmitry Babich, "Another Vote, Same Results," Russia Profile 4, 
no. 3 (April 2007): 7-8. 
51. Surkov's statement at "Vstrecha gruppy deputatov." 
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.170 on Mon, 3 Feb 2014 06:03:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime 515 
Gudkov's People's Party and Vasilii Shestakov's Socialist United Party of 
Russia.52 This is an indication of the project's virtuality?the latter was 
perhaps Russia's most misnamed party, having had four leaders and as 
many splits since 2003, whereas the former's authoritarian social policy 
had earned it the label the "Party of Death," a strange ally indeed for the 
Party of Life! 
Clearly, Just Russia was also intended to buttress the Kremlin's legiti 
macy in the outside world and rebut western protests about the unfairness 
of the electoral race. As Surkov stated in March 2007: "Just Russia com 
peted confidently in these elections, showing that the ferocity of [the] po 
litical battle is not waning. . . . Any democracy is characterized by a steady 
list of primary players . . . that four parties ran successfully shows that the 
political playing field has basically been formed."53 
Nevertheless, Just Russia's development was more contentious than 
this implies: the Russian press portrayed the demise of one of its pre 
decessors, Rodina, as due in part to a conflict between Surkov and Igor' 
Sechin's silovik clan in the Kremlin. Surkov had envisaged a limited aim 
for Rodina of harassing the communists but not threatening his favored 
United Russia. The Sechin group in contrast intended for Rodina under 
Rogozin to become a real contender for power.54 Elements of a similar 
conflict were present in Just Russia's emergence. Its leader Mironov often 
echoed the concerns of the siloviki as a centralizing "third-term" lobbyist 
(repeatedly calling for the president's term to be extended). According 
to many, Surkov was pressured by the siloviki to create Just Russia, which 
was to act as a vehicle for restraining United Russia and to guarantee the 
siloviki a position in the post-Putin firmament.55 
Such characterizations are both simplistic and unverifiable. More 
accurate would be to see Just Russia as a compromise between Kremlin 
elites, better characterized as shifting "factions" than as rigid "clans," that 
was created for a multiplicity of reasons.56 Mironov's relationship to the 
siloviki is ambiguous. Some see him as Sechin's confidant, others deny 
this, but no one questions his closeness to Putin.57 Just Russia reflects the 
52. Sergei Mironov quoted in Dmitrii Vladimirov, "Otkrytie solnechnoi sistemy: Mi 
ronov gotov ob"edinit' vsekh levykh, krome kommunistov," Rossiiskaia gazeta, 13 April 2007, 
at www.rg.ru/2007/04/13/mironov.html(last accessed 15 May 2009). 
53. Jonas Bernstein, "Russia: Kremlin 'Parties of Power' Sweep Regional Ballots," 
13 March 2007, RFE/RL Web site at www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/9ac0ed04 
a263-43e3-bc5c-f31176f51c3a.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
54. See Alexei Titkov, Party Number Four: Rodina: Whence and Why? (Moscow, 2006). 
55. For an overview of different scenarios, see interview with Aleksei Ziudin, "No 
vaia 'Zhizn" v polutorapartiinoi sisteme," at Politkom.ru (accessed 10 September 2006; no 
longer available). 
56. Sakwa, Putin, 81. 
57. For example, Andrei Smirnov, "Tatar Treaty Suggests Dissent Inside Kremlin on 
Regional Policy," Eurasia Daily Monitor 4, no. 33 (15 February 2007), at www.jamestown. 
org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews [ttjnews] =32494&tx_ttnews [backPid]=171 &no 
_cache=l (last accessed 15 May 2009), and "Sergei Mironov-lichnost' neordinarnaia," 
Vechernaia Moskva, at www.vmdaily.ru/article.php?aid=43665 (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
Aleksei Makarkin sees the siloviki as fundamentally disinterested in party building and 
skeptical towards Just Russia. Just Russia originated largely due to Mironov's personal ini 
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economic protectionism attributed to the siloviki but (unlike Rodina) not 
their nationalism. Surkov clearly supported Just Russia under the condi 
tion that it merely criticized but did not "spar with" United Russia, and, 
although it used Putin's image in some regional contests (for example, in 
Lipetsk) Surkov forbade it to use "administrative resources."58 Moreover, 
Putin admitted he helped create Just Russia and repeatedly supported it 
as part of a constructive opposition in a normal multiparty system.59 A Just 
Russia leader, Shestakov, was Putin's judo trainer and his cousin Igor'Pu 
tin (director of Samara Reserve factory) reportedly switched to Just Russia 
from United Russia. Yet Putin also sought to limit Just Russia's ambitions, 
stating on 1 February 2007: "This political battle is good as a matter of 
principle, and the fiercer the competition, the better. I hope . . . that it 
will be an intense political battle that does not resort to . . . mudsling 
ing, insults and so on."60 The problem of simultaneously encouraging and 
limiting Just Russia was to plague its development, like so many regime 
projects before it: as Surkov indicated, "I fear a battle among our own."61 
Organization and Political Profile 
After Surkov gave the green light, Just Russia quickly coalesced. A major 
sign of Kremlin coordination was that Rodina and the Pensioners' Party 
were thoroughly "worked over" prior to merger: their independent lead 
ers (Rogozin and Valerii Gartung) were replaced and they were deregis 
tered from the majority of regional election campaigns in March 2006. 
Once "tamed," their new leaders met with Putin and, in October 2006, 
decided to merge with the Party of Life, although each party ran separate 
regional campaigns that month.62 However, the Party of Life competed 
directly with the Pensioners' Party in four regions, which can be seen as 
an attempt to increase its "brand" value prior to merger. The effect of 
Kremlin support was immediate?the Party of Life (previously rarely poll 
ing more than 5 percent) "came to life," gaining 33 percent in Tuva and 
defeating United Russia's mayoral candidate in Samara. 
Just Russia formally united around the most nationally developed and 
centralized party, Rodina, adopting its statutes. The Party of Life and Pen 
sioners' Party transformed into public movements. The three main con 
stituent parties shared leading posts equally, with Mironov (Party of Life) 
as chairman, Aleksandr Babakov (Rodina) as secretary of the presidium of 
the central council, and Igor' Zotov (Pensioners' Party) as central council 
tiative; he succeeded in persuading Putin and thereby Surkov. Makarkin, interview, Mos 
cow, 16 April 2008. 
58. Surkov's statement at "Vstrecha gruppy deputatov." 
59. For example 'Vstrecha s Uchastimami Mezhdunarodnogo Diskussionnogo Kluba 
'Valdai,'" atwww.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/09/144011.shtml (last accessed 15 May 
2009). 
60. "Transcript of Press Conference with the Russian and Foreign Media, 1 February 
2007, Round Hall, Kremlin, Moscow," atwww.kremlin.ru (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
61. Surkov's statement at 'Vstrecha gruppy deputatov." 
62. "Partiinyi peredel," 15 August 2006, at lenta.ru/articles/2006/08/15/party/ (last 
accessed 15 May 2009). 
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secretary. This "shotgun wedding" remained contentious, however, and 
intraparty rivalries hindered Just Russia in the March 2007 regional elec 
tions. After the 2007 Duma campaign, it was suggested that the Party of 
Life was attempting an intraparty putsch, with Mironov favoring his pro 
teges such as Nikolai Levichev (who replaced Babakov as fraction leader). 
The ongoing ill-feeling between Babakov and Levichev and the particular 
prejudice directed against Pensioners' Party personnel complicated party 
performance.63 
Nevertheless, the party organization crystallized, ultimately claiming 
almost 500,000 members by November 2008, a million short of United 
Russia, but dwarfing Rodina and the KPRF (both with approximately 
180,000). The party inherited the majority of Rodina's Duma fraction with 
additions from independents and United Russia defectees, numbering 33 
by mid-2007. In early 2007, the party also formed three youth organi 
zations: Pobeda was the "official" organization aiming to link the youth 
wings of parties such as the Social Democrats and People's Party; Ura! 
(based on the former Rodina youth movement) appealed to more radical 
elements of the electorate opposed to official youth movements such as 
Nashi; finally, Liga spravedlivosti played a political technological and 
agitational role.64 Although Just Russia also made attempts to court 
trade unionists, the main unions remained unswervingly loyal to United 
Russia.65 
Certainly the party swiftly attracted sponsorship; by March 2007 
its campaign funds ($17 million) were second only to United Russia's 
($25 million).66 Influential donors included former Rodina members 
Aleksandr Lebedev, president of the National Reserve Bank, and Baba 
kov (whose wealth comes from the communications sector) .67 Mironov's 
power base, the Federation Council, included six dollar-billionaires and a 
dozen dollar-millionaires, although the extent to which these individuals 
supported Just Russia was unclear.68 According to Natal'ia Morar', Gaz 
63. "'Spravedlivaia Rossiia' snova stanovit'sia Partiei zhizni," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 
11 December 2007, atwww.ng.ru/politics/2007-12-ll/3_esery.html (last accessed 15 May 
2009). 
64. Natal'ia Kostenko, "'Spravedlivaia Rossiia' organizuet molodezhnyi front," Neza 
visimaia gazeta, 15 October 2007, atwww.ng.ru/politics/2007-10-15/3_esery.html (last ac 
cessed 15 May 2009). 
65. Igor' Romanov, "Partiitsy rvut chlenov profsoiuzov na chasti," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 
26 April 2007, at www.ng.ru/printed/77801 (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
66. Andrei Riskin, "Pod raznymi znamenami na meste shagom marsh," Nezavisimaia 
gazeta, 12 March 2007, at www.ng.ru/ngregions/2007-03-12/13_region.html (last ac 
cessed 15 May 2009). 
67. "A Just Division," Moscow News, 5 July 2007, at www.mnweekly.ru/politics/ 
20070705/55260906.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). Babakov is also former chair of 
the board of directors of TsKA football club. Lebedev's personal fortune is estimated at 
$3.6 billion, while another prominent party supporter was Andrei Molchanov, former 
head of LSR, the largest construction company in northwest Russia, with a personal for tune estimated at $660 million. By 2008, Lebedev had split from Just Russia. 
68. Dmitry Shusharin, "Nationalism Gives Way to Social Promises in Russia," RIA 
Novosti, 13 March 2007, at en.rian.ru/analysis/20070313/61934418.html (last accessed 
15 May 2009). 
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prom and the presidential administration also made contributions to Just 
Russia to the tune of $50-100 million.69 
On the other hand, the party did soon develop a clear, if inconsistent, 
ideological profile. By early 2007 (with a view to combating the communists) 
Just Russia pitched itself as a catch-all socialist rather than social democratic 
party, while still using slogans such as "New socialism, social democracy and 
humanism," "Socialism 3.0," and even the "third way."70 Party documenta 
tion was replete with leftist terms like solidarity, socialjustice, even exploitation. 
The party also offered a more radically redistributionist (even revanchist) 
profile than modern social democracy, rejecting the idea of "equality of op 
portunities." It proposed progressive taxation alongside windfall taxes on 
luxury goods and profits from 1990s privatizations and suggested using the 
Stabilization Fund to redistribute private companies' super-profits, raise 
pensions, and subsidize social utilities and welfare.71 The party promised 
a market economy but not a market society and pledged to combat large 
scale capital.72 Its radical image was reinforced by the tendency of the press 
to refer to its members as the "Esery" (SRs), implying continuity with the 
prewar left-populist Socialist Revolutionaries. 
Just Russia was also strongly populist, both in the sense of "cheap" 
promises to all and sundry, and in its marked anti-establishment ethos, 
which was directed at the corruption and bureaucratism of local elite and 
United Russia functionaries, or at the "state of elites and clans" in gen 
eral, but rarely at the federal government and symptomatically never at 
the president. It attacked local bureaucrats as nothing more than crimi 
nal swindlers, while simultaneously presenting itself as the unsullied de 
fender of democratic freedoms trampled on by central (ist) diktat. Hence 
its complaints about the exclusion of candidates from elections, restrictive 
electoral legislation, and the nonelection of governors. Just Russia explic 
itly sought to tap the protest vote (especially those who might have voted 
"against all" before this option was removed from the ballot in 2006) while 
attempting to mask its own origins in the bureaucracy with an image of 
being the "party of working people" planning to give "ordinary Russians" 
a greater role in decision making.73 
69. Natalia Morar', '"Chernaia kassa' Kremlia," 10 December 2007, at newtimes.ru/ 
magazine/issue_44/article_7.htm (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
70. "Predvybornaia programma: 'Doverie vo imia budushchego,'" 
at www.spravedlivo 
.ru/information/section_ll/section_54 (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
71. "Programmnoe zaiavlenie partii 'Spravedlivaia Rossiia: Rodina/Pensionery/ 
Zhizn,'" at spravedlivo.ru/about/documents/section_371 (accessed 
1 March 2008; no 
longer available); and "Politicheskaia platform partii," 
at www.spravedlivo.ru/about/ 
documents/section_599 (accessed 1 March 2008; no longer available). 
72. Boris Makarenko and Tatiana Stanovaia, "Sotsializm vmesto sotsial-demokratii," 
at Politkom.ru (accessed 10 March 2007; no longer available). 
73. For example, see the interview with Mironov: "My nakhodims'ia 
v oppozitsii 
k politicheskomu monopolizmu," at www.spravedlivo.ru/press/section_326/564.smx 
(accessed 13 February 2007; no longer available); "Sergei Mironov: Sotsialnyi ideal i 
sovremmenoi politike," at www.spravedlivo.ru/press/section_326/1427.smx (accessed 
25 February 2008; no longer available); and the party manifesto, 
at www.spravedlivo.ru/ 
english?action=articles&id+3 (accessed 25 February 2008; no longer available). 
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Clearly Just Russia intended to compete with United Russia and the 
KPRF simultaneously, although its competition against the communists 
became increasingly important. It attacked the communists (unironi 
cally!) as an obsolete "pseudo-opposition," and its proposals to merge 
the left were designed to paint the communists as the main obstacles to 
left-wing unity. More brazen still was its appropriation of Soviet style and 
symbolism. Even the KPRF did not have a Politburo or Orgburo like Just 
Russia, although these were reconstituted (as the Presidium and Central 
Council) in March 2008. In April 2007, Just Russia successfully lobbied 
Putin to prevent United Russia from removing the hammer and sickle 
from the Victory Banner (the flag of the Russian Army) .74 
Although Just Russia was a strongly programmatic party, it remained 
a strange and inconsistent amalgam. In July 2008, the party joined the 
Socialist International as an observer, rather than the European Left Party 
as some of its radical policies implied. Nevertheless, its support for Rus 
sian "family values" (rejecting tolerance for same-sex marriage and drug 
legalization) made its accommodation to the more libertarian family of 
European socialists problematic. Furthermore, its socialist principles were 
impossible to square with its leadership by multimillionaires, and, as a re 
sult, parallels might be drawn to the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine 
(United), an oligarchic vehicle alleged to have as much relation to social 
democracy as a Mercedes to a tractor.75 
Electoral Promise and Predicament 
Although Just Russia has continually denied that it is in any way the re 
gime's "sparring partner," it has already become obvious that its "regime" 
and "project" facets are of more importance than its "programmatic" el 
ements. The question was not whether this was a party of power but of 
"how much power"? How able was it to challenge United Russia's near 
monopoly, and how able was its pseudo-opposition stance of becoming a 
real opposition? 
In the March 2007 regional elections, Just Russia threatened to be 
come just such a real opposition. It finished among the top three in 12 out 
of 14 regions, came in third in 6, second in 5, and first in 1 (Stavropol'), 
gaining 15.53 percent of the party list vote and 11.7 percent of seats, a nar 
row third to the communists (see table l).76 This exceeded the combined 
performance of Rodina, the Party of Life, and the Pensioners' Party in 
2003 (13.99 percent) .The performance was certainly patchy, exceeding 
the 2003 level of its three predecessors in 6 regions, stabilizing in 4, and 
seeing its vote fall in 4 regions, and Just Russia was far less successful when 
its local organizations were not co-coordinated and the party lacked lo 
cal notables. Nevertheless, given that the full merger of three parties had 
74. Ivan Iartsev, "Esery podniali znamia pobedy," at Politkom.ru (accessed 26 April 
2007; no longer available). 
75. Wilson, Virtual Politics, 134. 
76. Data from Russian Central Electoral Commission, at www.cikrf.ru/cikrf/actual/ 
regvibory_110507.jsp (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
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Table 1 
Just Russia's Electoral Performance 
Region Date Result Region Date Result 
Dagestan 11-03-2007 10.68 Kalmykiia 02-03-2008 4.99 
Komi 11-03-2007 15.49 Sakha 02-03-2008 14.56 
Stavropol 11-03-2007 37.64 Altai K 02-03-2008 7.70 
Vologda 11-03-2007 20.91 Amur 02-03-2008 5.62 
Leningrad 11-03-2007 20.94 Ivanovo 02-03-2008 10.27 
Moscow 11-03-2007 8.86 Rostov 02-03-2008 5.13 
Murmansk 11-03-2007 16.18 Sverdlovsk 02-03-2008 6.26 
Omsk 11-03-2007 4.83 Ulianovsk 02-03-2008 7.77 
Orel 11-03-2007 12.60 Iaroslavl' 02-03-2008 deregistered 
Pskov 11-03-2007 15.68 Zabaikal'skii 12-10-2008 9.29 
Samara 11-03-2007 15.14 Irkutsk 12-10-2008 8.12 
Tomsk 11-03-2007 7.90 Kemerovo 12-10-2008 5.51 
Tiumen 11-03-2007 8.78 Sakhalin 12-10-2008 8.50 
St. Petersburg 11-03-2007 21.90 Chechnia 12-10-2008 9.20 
Krasnoiarsk 24-04-2007 12.40 Kabardino- 01-03-2009 12.26 
Buriatiia 02-12-2007 11.96 Balkariia 
Mordoviia 02-12-2007 1.56 Karachaevo- 01-03-2009 5.02 
Kamchatka 02-12-2007 deregistered Cherkesiia 
North Osetiia 02-12-2007 8.92 Tatarstan 01-03-2009 4.83 
Udmurtia 02-12-2007 12.94 Khakasiia 01-03-2009 7.18 
Penza 02-12-2007 7.04 Arkhangelsk 01-03-2009 17.84 
Saratov 02-12-2007 13.52 Briansk 01-03-2009 8.61 
Smolensk 02-12-2007 13.55 Vladimir 01-03-2009 8.84 
State Duma 02-12-2007 7.76 Volgograd 01-03-2009 13.34 
Bashkortostan 02-03-2008 3.46 Nenets 01-03-2009 12.70 
Overall average: 10.96 
Sources: "Russia's Party System and the 2007 Duma Election," Russian Analytical Digest, 
no. 31 (27 November 2007); "Partiia regional'noi vlasti," Kommersant", 04 March 2008, 
at www.kommersant.ru/daily.aspxPdate=20080304, and "Resul'taty regional'nykh vy 
borov v sravnenii s resul'tatami vyborov v Gosdumu 2 dekabria 2007 goda," Kommersant", 
14 October 2008, at www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspxPDocsID=1040899 (last accessed 
7 May 2009); www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom (accessed 15 April 2009; no longer 
available). 
only occurred on the eve of the election, the results at least indicated Just 
Russia's potential as a national force.77 
Nevertheless, the March 2007 elections were also the party's high-water 
mark. It succeeded best where it was able to capitalize on disaffection 
within the elite and to capture the protest vote (as in Stavropol', Vologda, 
St. Petersburg, and Samara). Its Stavropol' sensation (the only election 
where United Russia lost) was achieved where United Russia governor 
77. For details on the 2007 elections, see Boris Makarenko and Aleksei Makarkin, 
"Regional'nye vybory-2007: Presentatsiia 'Spravedlivoi Rossii,'" 
at Politkom.ru (accessed 
12 March 2007; no longer available). 
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Aleksandr Chernogorov was deeply unpopular. Just Russia exploited his 
acrimonious divorce with slogans such as "Sell the Bendey, pay the Ali 
mony."78 This was a potentially disastrous scenario for the authorities. As 
one Kremlin official noted: "The most dangerous thing . . . would be to 
tear administrative resources apart and pit one part against another."79 
Just Russia's successes involved real, dirty conflict with a lot at stake. It was 
emerging as a "second party of power" and was rapidly attracting disaf 
fected members of the elite either in current conflict with United Russia 
or sensing their exclusion from the post-Putin landscape. New adherents 
included elected mayors in conflict with appointed United Russia gover 
nors, disgruntled ex-governors, those far down on United Russia's party 
list, deputies from single mandate districts or minor parties facing elec 
toral oblivion (such as Iabloko, Union of Right Forces [Soiuz pravykh sil, 
SPS], and even the KPRF's youth wing). 
On the positive side, Just Russia was acting as intended, solving the 
problem of "vertical mobility" caused by United Russia's relative electoral 
inertia, bringing different elite groups into the spoils system and allowing 
disaffected elites to engage in opposition without being seen as outright 
"traitors." On the other hand, Just Russia faced the same dilemma as Ro 
dina before it. According to experts, it appeared to be able to take votes 
from all other parties.80 In order to compete effectively with the com 
munists, however, it would need to outbid them in "oppositionness." Yet 
since the communists had already been pared down to their core vote, any 
electoral expansion was disproportionately likely to occur at the expense 
of United Russia. Moreover, where elite conflict discredited both United 
Russia and Just Russia, as in Krasnoiarskii krai and the Volgograd mayoral 
elections, the communists were the main beneficiaries.81 
Even this limited competition was threatening as the Kremlin con 
templated life after Putin, threatening divisive elite conflict akin to 1999 
rather than a seamless succession. With Kremlin figures warning that Just 
Russia had "gone too far," a truce was reached after the March 2007 elec 
tions. Mironov and United Russia governor Valentina Matvienko agreed 
not to act as the "locomotives" for their party lists in St. Petersburg (which 
would have brought elite heavyweights into head-on conflict). United 
Russia agreed to support Mironov as St. Petersburg assembly representa 
tive to the Federation Council, removing threats to his speakership, while 
the United Russia and Just Russia fractions in the St. Petersburg assembly 
78. Carl Schreck, "Dirty Tricks Popular in Campaign Battles," Moscow Times, 9 March 
2007, atwww.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/03/09/011.html (last accessed 15 May 
2009). Chernogorov never recovered his authority after this defeat and resigned in April 
2008. 
79. Cited in Johnsons Russia List, no. 217 (28 September 2006) atwww.cdi.org/russia/ 
johnson/default.cfm (accessed 25 March 2008; no longer available) 
80. Olga Korotkova, "General'naia repetitsiia vyborov v Gosdumu: Rossiia opiat' 
polevela," Komsomolskaia pravda, 13 March 2007, at www.kp.ru/daily/23868.7/64403 (last 
accessed 15 May 2009). 
81. On the success of 31-year-old communist Roman Grebennikov in Volgograd's 
mayoral election on 20 May 2007, see "Volgogradskaia bitva," 21 May 2007, at www.lenta 
.ru/articles/2007/05/21/red (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
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pledged cooperation.82 Mironov later emphasized Just Russia's role as a 
constructive opposition that concentrated on the communists as its chief 
opponents.83 
Just Russia's 2007 Duma campaign revealed both the Kremlin's con 
cern to keep it within manageable bounds and its increasing disinterest in 
the project. True enough, the Kremlin refused to register the "Great Rus 
sia" party in 2007 despite its party statutes being modeled exactly on Just 
Russia's. Great Russia was formed by ex-Rodina nationalists who had been 
excluded from Just Russia and was formed with probable support from si 
loviki disappointed by the lack of influence over Just Russia's platform and 
policies. Dmitrii Rogozin's appeals to former Rodina members to defect to 
his party represented a real danger.84 However, the continued existence 
of two left-wing "spoiler parties" that threatened to set up an alternative 
left-wing party indicated Surkov's desire to limit Just Russia's maneuver 
ing room. The "Patriots of Russia" were headed by Gennadii Semigin, a 
longtime Surkov confidant; the Party of Social Justice (Partiia sotsial'noi 
spravedlivosti) was led by Aleksei Podberezkin, one of Medvedev's analysts 
and a former Kremlin "agent of influence" within the KPRF.85 
Moreover, Just Russia lost momentum and electoral support as the 
December 2007 election approached. Significantly, as the party's electoral 
lists were drawn up, "politically interesting" personalities (such as left 
wing economist Sergei Glaz'ev and Aleksandr Lebedev, the party finan 
cier who had fought a fierce Moscow mayoral campaign in 2003) were 
excluded, allegedly under Kremlin pressure.86 Heading the party list with 
Mironov were Svetlana Goriacheva, an ex-communist Duma deputy, and 
Sergei Shargunov, leader of the Ura! youth movement, both of whom had 
radical anti-establishment images but negligible national political influ 
ence. Shargunov was dropped from the party list once it was revealed he 
had formerly been a member of the radical National Bolshevik Party and 
a Putin critic, and Ura! was disaffiliated.87 
The biggest shot across the bow was Putin's September 2007 decision 
to head the United Russia party list, which instantly destroyed Just Russia's 
raison d'etre as the true presidential party trying to protect the Good 
Tsar from the "evil boyars" (in United Russia). The Kremlin had finally 
decided to avoid all risks in "operation successor." We can sum up the 
Kremlin's thinking about Just Russia in table 2. The Just Russia project 
82. Ivan Iartsev, "Piterskaia partiia-edinaia i spravedlivaia," at Politkom.ru (accessed 
21 March 2007; no longer available). 
83. "Vystuplenie Sergeia Mironova na Tsentral'nom sovete partii 'Spravedlivaia 
Ros 
siia,'" (12 April 2007) at www.spravedlivo.ru/about/section_10/section_297/1805.smx 
(accessed 14 February 2008; no longer available). 
84. Igor' Dmitriev, "Patriocheskii gambit," Moskovskie novosti, 6-12 July 2007, 
at www 
.mn.ru/issue/2007-26-7 (accessed 19 March 2008; no longer available). 
85. Andrei Kamakin, "Operatsiia 'S Novoi Dumoi,'" Itogi, 8January 2007, 
at www.itogi 
.ru/Paper2007.nsf/Article/Itogi_2007_01_06_1534.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
86. Tat'iana Stanovaia, "Sud'ba 'Spravedlivoi Rossii,'" at Politkom.ru (accessed 
29 October 2007; no longer available). 
87. Kseniia Veretennikova, "'Ural' Tovarishchi," Vremia novostei, 22 October 2007, at 
www.vremya.ru/2007/193/4/189654.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
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Table 2 
Just Russia in the Kremlin's Calculations 
Advantages Risks 
Semblance of competition Real competition 
Co-optation of elite and social Incentivizing opposition 
opposition 
Marginalization of communists Martyring communists 
Guarantee of pro-Kremlin parliamentary Weakening of United Russia within 
majority parliament 
Jolt for United Russia Discontent within United Russia 
Increasing Putin's/successors' room for Unclear relationship to Putin/successor 
maneuver 
Party campaigns for successor Opposition becomes visibly fake 
initially offered many advantages: "managed" opposition and limited elite 
turnover, the potential to marginalize the communists and to provide a 
"sparring partner" for United Russia during the campaign. In addition, it 
could increase the pro-Kremlin deputies within the Duma, limiting risks 
during the transition to a successor and providing an alternative presi 
dential party (or at least electoral cheerleader) .Just Russia simply offered 
too many risks, however: elite sparring threatened to spill over into real 
competition (whereby the communists, as the only semi-independent op 
position, might benefit as "martyred outsiders"). Still worse, effective elite 
competition potentially threatened not only the positions of individual 
United Russia deputies and regional leaders but the very dominance of 
United Russia within the state Duma as the guarantor of the stability of "op 
eration successor." The more effective Just Russia was, the more it risked 
an elite split as in 1999, but the more controlled it was, the more it looked 
simply fake. In these circumstances there was little prospect of alternative 
scenarios, whereby for instance the two parties of power might have sup 
ported rival presidential successors, or Just Russia might have become the 
main presidential party behind a successor candidate. Instead, as soon as 
it was no longer useful, Just Russia was simply dropped?indicating the 
profound risk-averseness of Putin's Kremlin, and suggesting that, until 
the last, there was most likely an array of Kremlin plans for the succes 
sion rather than one long-term project. Ultimately, turning the election 
into a plebiscite on Putin's record maximized United Russia's reliance on 
him and his control over parliament and party and minimized the risks 
of unexpected elite conflict or defection represented by projects like Just 
Russia. 
After being abandoned by Putin, Just Russia floundered badly, try 
ing unconvincingly to present itself as the only force guaranteeing Putin's 
nonparty "national leader" status. In 2003 Rodina had possessed enough 
"virtual" independence and elite support to pull off a successful regime 
sponsored "anti-elite" campaign. In 2007, Just Russia lacked charismatic 
leaders, consistent regime support, and distinct campaign messages 
(with several parties claiming to profess "social justice"). It hemorrhaged 
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members and funders, already disaffected by the leaders' personnel 
choices but apparently dismayed that Putin had not decided to head what 
was self-evidently (to them) his true party, with its regional branches split 
ting in Voronezh, Sverdlovsk, St. Petersburg, Kirov, and Kamchatka.88 
Just Russia's eventual result, squeaking over the 7 percent barrier 
to become the fourth Duma party, was a far cry from its expectations 
of second place, but under the circumstances a success of sorts. Fraud 
cannot be ruled out entirely, although it is notable that both pre- and 
post-election polls corroborate Just Russia's vote share.89 The authorities 
did not abandon Just Russia entirely?for example, Kremlin consultant 
Vadim Konovalov was appointed to head the party's Duma apparat dur 
ing the election campaign.90 Apparently, although Just Russia had lost 
its tactical utility for the Kremlin in terms of "operation successor," the 
longer-term project of a "relevant left" had been confirmed. Yet perhaps 
the simplest explanation for why Just Russia survived at all is that it (albeit 
minimally) preserved its main function of representing center-left voters 
too moderate and too pro-Putin for the KPRF and too distrustful of its 
bureaucratic, monopolistic tendencies to vote for United Russia. In addi 
tion, its continued emphasis on pension issues may have preserved some 
residual loyalty from Pensioners' Party voters. 
Moreover, under Medvedev's presidency, Just Russia preserved a frag 
ile niche. Initially, the omens were not promising. The decision by the 
party to support Medvedev's candidacy in December 2007 (along with 
three other parties) was purportedly a spontaneous democratic decision 
reached through party discussion of Medvedev's "social" credentials. This 
remarkably Abacha-esque group "coronation" made Medvedev's eventual 
election a fait accompli, however, and as communist leader Ivan Mel'nikov 
noted, made an absolute mockery of intraparty democracy.91 Although 
this decision was logical in terms of providing Just Russia immediate vis 
ibility and the promise of favors returned, it was a self-defeating maneuver 
for the party qua party. In the 2 March 2008 regional elections, Just Rus 
sia scraped to a poor fourth, averaging just 7.31 percent in ten regions, 
88. For example, Aleksei Ziudin, "Ataka na Mironova," Moskovskie novosti, 26 October 
1 November 2007, at www.mn.ru/issue/2007-42-7 (accesssed 19 March 2008; no longer 
available); by the end of 2007, Just Russia was only the fifth best-funded party with assets 
of $14.98 million, see www.cikrf.ru/politparty/finance/rashod.jsp (last accessed 15 May 
2009). 
89. For allegations that Just Russia's result was artificially inflated, see Nikolai Petrov, 
"The Consequences of the State Duma Elections for Russia's Electoral System," Russian 
Analytical Digest, no. 32 (14 December 2007): 5-8. For Just Russia compared with elec 
toral forecasts, see "The Results of the Duma Elections," Russian Analytical Digest, no. 32 
(14 December 2007): 10. 
90. Igor' Romanov, Ivan Rodin, and Natalia Kostenko, "Eseram dali dobro: Novaia 
Duma skoree vsego okazhetsia chetyrekhpartiinoi," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 29 November 2007, 
atwww.ng.ru/politics/2007-ll-29/l_esery.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
91. Ksenia Veretennikova and Andrei Denisov, "Natsproekt 'Dmitrii Medvedev': 
Vladimir Putin nazval tret'ego prezidenta Rossii," Vremia novostei, 11 December 2007, 1-2, 
atwww.vremya.ru/2007/227/4/193865.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
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failing to surpass the 7 percent barrier in half of these (see table 1), and 
losing the protection from administrative pressure it had earlier enjoyed. 
Just Russia could not combine full support for Medvedev as president at a 
federal level and opposition to United Russia in the regions, and its fail 
ure to present its own presidential candidate contrasted poorly with the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Liberarno-demokraticheskaia partiia 
Rossii)and KPRF.92 
Yet in the longer term, Just Russia regained its elite patronage. At the 
April 2008 congress (held in the Kremlin) its populist rhetoric and com 
munist style receded in favor of a left-wing social democratic program 
dressed up as "new socialism" that promised an emphasis on individual 
democratic and social rights, progressive taxation, and high social spend 
ing.93 In the October 2008 and March 2009 regional elections it margin 
ally improved on its December 2007 performance with an average vote of 
9.37 percent (see table 1). More significantly, the party was not debarred 
from any contest (even Chechnia), and placed third (ahead of the Liberal 
Democratic Party). Both Surkov and Medvedev spoke favorably of Just 
Russia's central role within the party system, and there were even sugges 
tions that Medvedev was patronizing Just Russia directly. Certainly, when 
Podberezkin's Party of Social Justice joined Just Russia in September 2008 
(shortly followed by the Russian Ecological Party "Greens"?Rossiiskaia 
ekologicheskaia partiia "Zelenye"), Just Russia gained closer links with 
both Medvedev and Surkov, and a certain, circumscribed, distancing of 
Just Russia from Putin was observable (for example, the party opposed the 
2009-11 budget on first reading, and its 2008 program promised a signifi 
cant reversal of Putin-era centralization).94 An indication of Just Russia's 
possible centrality to Medvedev's calculations was indicated in a June 2008 
report to Medvedev's think tank, the Institute of Contemporary Develop 
ment, which envisaged a gradual state-directed liberalization of the politi 
cal system over two electoral terms. In this, Just Russia could potentially 
become Russia's second party (after United Russia), providing its ideology 
and personnel were renewed and that the authorities stopped using "ad 
ministrative resources" against it.95 At the time of writing, though, such 
liberalization remains fictional: Medvedev's November 2008 proposals to 
decrease party registration requirements and to delink Duma elections 
from presidential elections were positive developments offset by the two 
year increase in the presidential term. Perhaps a more telling indicator of 
"business as usual" under Medvedev was that Just Russia was deregistered from the 26 April 2009 mayoral elections in the Olympic city of Sochi. 
92. "Partiia regional'noi vlasti," Kommersant", 14 March 2008, at www.kommersant 
.ru/daily.aspx?date=20080304 (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
93. Programma Partii "Spravedlivaia Rossiia 
" 
at the Just Russia Web site, www. spravedlivo .ru (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
94. Especially proposals for an elected Federation Council and the restoration of the 
pre-2007 Duma electoral system. 
95. Demokratiia: Razvitie Rossiiskoi modeli (Moscow, 2008), at newtimes.ru/Files/lll/ 
democratic.doc (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
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A 77 percent victory for the United Russia candidate (without even cam 
paigning) was Putinism in microcosm. 
Just Russia emerged in 2006-7 as the coincidence of several factors. 
Principal among these were the Kremlin's long-term wish to provide more 
predictable competition for United Russia. Just Russia would function as 
an "alternative party of power," testing United Russia's electoral and policy 
responses while providing an outlet for the opposition. Simultaneously, 
Just Russia was seen as a "favored opposition party" continuing the long 
term aim of marginalizing the communists. Shorter term aims were to 
provide for stability during the post-Putin succession period, maximiz 
ing Putin's support over the electoral field while incorporating competing 
elites into the policy process and adding to domestic and external elec 
toral legitimacy. In this way, Just Russia directly parallels parastatal parties 
in countries like Mexico and Nigeria. 
This project achieved mixed results. Unlike previous regime-led 
"moderate" socialist opposition, Just Russia gained a niche in parliament. 
Part of the reason is simply increasingly effective Kremlin management 
of the party system. Backed by astute use of electoral technology and a 
popular president, the Kremlin is able (within limits) to conjure parties 
to order. Putin's personal popularity was vital when upwards of 30 percent 
of the electorate declared they would vote for anyone of Putin's choice. 
The prospects for a managed opposition are far better when the manager 
himself is popular (unlike for much of the El'tsin period). The 1999 elec 
tions had already shown that the "Putin effect" could be shared by more 
than one party (Union of Right Forces and Unity), so the ability of his 
endorsement to boost two "parties of power" is undoubted. By the same 
token, the limits to Just Russia's growth were defined by the Kremlin, and 
increasing regime concern with the destabilizing potential of the project 
led to its near-abandonment. 
Although Just Russia is an entirely manipulated party, it is not en 
tirely manufactured: its survival after the Kremlin withdrew its explicit 
blessing appears to be because its socialist(ic) platform reflects long-term 
electoral realities: the decline in support for the communists alongside 
the persistence of moderate leftist anti-establishment tendencies. Given 
a freer and fairer electoral environment in Russia, such a socialist party 
might conceivably perform better without the Kremlin's interference, and 
the 15-20 percent of the vote promised by its March 2007 showing is not 
inconceivable. 
The trajectory of Just Russia reveals several things about Russian 
politics. This article endorses the view of contemporary Russian politics 
as a virtualized realm, where public politics is heavily distorted and ma 
nipulated to provide an imitation of pluralism and democracy within 
an 
authoritarian regime. The "virtuality" of Just Russia is evident in several 
paradoxes; an "insider" party claiming to be 
an "outsider"; an anti-elite 
party with millionaire backers; Mironov's Pauline conversion to socialism; 
United and Just Russia's mutual enmity and their leaders' mutual friend 
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ship; and most graphically, Just Russia's sudden support for a presidential 
candidate it had never previously even acknowledged.96 
Virtual politics is not fictional politics, however. Just Russia has a real 
existence, a concrete structure, members, supporters, it even has Duma 
members (such as Goriacheva and Oleg Shein) who are convinced social 
ists, but to an overwhelming degree it operates within constraints imposed 
from above. Similarly, pluralism in Russia is not entirely imitational, even 
in the party realm, and the emergence of Just Russia revealed significant 
elite competition within the Kremlin (over the function and role of op 
position) and at the local level (over office and material incentives). The 
party maps only partially onto popular conceptualizations of Kremlin 
"clans" with support by the Sechin group and its reputed loss of influ 
ence only part of the explanation. Rather, Just Russia's rise and (near) fall 
indicates shifting constellations of short-term elite interests, with several 
Kremlin groups supporting its emergence in 2006 and losing interest in 
2007. Its genesis certainly indicates deep elite tensions behind-the-scenes 
and a near-paranoid Kremlin concern with preventing opposition mobi 
lization in the public realm. Just Russia also indicates the limits of virtual 
politics: even this "tamed" opposition threatened, briefly, to escape its 
masters' control. The Kremlin may create parties to order but it cannot 
always order them to behave. 
Just Russia is another indication that some regimes have become very 
skilled at imitating multiparty democracy. The party has precedents in 
communist "popular democracy" where plebiscitary support rather than 
informed choice was the operating electoral principle. Moreover, it has 
close parallels in other parastatal "opposition" parties that play an under 
studied but important role in regime survival and "democratic" legiti 
macy. Undoubtedly Kremlin technologists would abhor any comparison 
to Nigeria, but Russia's parastatal parties (the latest being Right Cause 
[Pravoe delo], a shotgun marriage of three liberal parties clearly mod 
elled on Just Russia) serve basically similar functions to presidentially de 
creed party systems: furthering ostentatious multipartism while control 
ling elite mobilization and access to spoils. Arguably the differences are 
not in kind but in degree: Kremlin elites are simply better (more imagi 
native, more sophisticated, and more subtle) than Nigerian dictators at 
managing their opposition. The parallel is not heartening: in 2007-8 the 
highly choreographed Russian election campaign looked ever less like a 
democracy ("sovereign" or not) and ever more like authoritarianism. It is 
clear that elite circles are now discussing managed political liberalization. 
Nevertheless, the Kremlin's democratic pretensions can be taken seriously 
only when it manages its opposition far less. 
96. On Boris Gryzlov and Mironov's friendship, see "Mironov, Sergei," Lentapediia, 
19 December 2007, atwww.lenta.ru/lib/14159448/full.htm (last accessed 15 May 2009). 
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